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The participation of Canadian troops in the Sicilian campaign of July and August 1943 
marked a distinctive shift in Canada’s war policy, 
and significantly influenced the employment 
of the army until the end of hostilities in May 
1945. Advocates of Canadian participation in 
the campaign argued that the overseas army, 
which had been on garrison duty in Britain since 
1939, needed to gain combat experience. Yet it 
was largely due to political reasons and concerns 
with prestige rather than military necessity that 
prompted the Canadian government to bring 
increasing, and ultimately effective, pressure 
to bear on the British government to include a 
Canadian infantry division and tank brigade in 
Operation “Husky” – the invasion of Sicily. 
Prior to 1943, the government’s main concern 
had been to avoid any circumstances that 
might lead to overseas conscription.1  The heavy 
casualties that might make overseas conscription 
necessary could only be the result of sustained 
action by the land forces. For that reason 
Mackenzie King, the Canadian prime minister, 
had been content not to push the senior Allied 
powers, especially Britain, to find combat roles 
for the Canadian Army which was in position to 
defend the British Isles. King had been happy not 
to participate at all in the strategic deliberations 
of the great powers. When Sir Robert Borden, 
Canada’s conservative prime minister during the 
First World War, had in 1917-1918 demanded a 
Canadian voice in British strategy, the price had 
been increased military commitments and the 
imposition of conscription that severely divided 
the country.2  King desperately wanted to avoid a 
repeat of that situation. 
By the fall of 1942 the army had been in Britain 
for three years. The danger of an Axis invasion 
of the British Isles had long past, and the only 
serious combat the army had seen in Europe was 
the disastrous single day assault on Dieppe on 
19 August 1942.3  General A.G.L. McNaughton, 
the commander of the army, was not greatly 
concerned by the lack of combat experience. 
His primary objective was to make sure the 
Canadian army was not broken up, and remained 
as a united, national formation for the final 
assault on Germany. By the fall of 1942, many 
disagreed with this policy. The United States 
had only entered the war at the end of 1941, 
over two years after Canada, and yet its army 
was already fighting in the Pacific and preparing 
for large-scale operations in Europe. Many 
Canadians, including influential journalists, 
were asking why Canada’s army was not more 
active.4  J.L. Ralston, the minister of National 
Defence, and many senior army officers, other 
than McNaughton, were also keen for early action 
by any means possible. They were concerned 
about the morale of the troops in England, and 
feared that Canada’s army might in fact miss out 
on any substantial share in combat, which would 
be a crippling blow to the reputation of the armed 
forces, and to Canada’s international influence. 
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Ralston and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, 
chief of the general staff, put the need for early 
employment of any substantial part of the 
army directly to General Alan F. Brooke, Chief 
of Imperial General Staff (CIGS),`1 during a 
visit to the United Kingdom in October 1942.5  
Ralston asked Brooke to make sure Churchill 
understood that “there were no strings on the 
employment of the Canadian Army” and “that the 
Government of Canada wished it to be used where 
it would make the greatest contribution.”6  Before 
meeting with Brooke, Ralston and Stuart met 
privately with Vincent Massey, the Canadian High 
Commissioner, to make sure that the Canadian 
government’s senior representative in Britain 
was fully prepared to cooperate in the effort to 
persuade the British to find employment for the 
army in 1943.7  It is particularly significant that 
the minister of National Defence and the chief 
of the general staff went to Massey and General 
Brooke before they had explained to General 
McNaughton that they were pushing for an 
active role for any part of the Canadian Army. 
Normally, McNaughton, as the commander of 
the Canadian Army in Britain would have been 
closely associated with any such appeal. 
Ralston’s view that the army might be sidelined 
seemed to gain weight when in November 1942 the 
US Army joined the British Army for Operation 
“Torch,” the large-scale invasion of north-western 
Africa.8 Canada did not even receive prior 
notification of “Torch.” Mackenzie King was not 
particularly concerned by this.  However, the 
situation changed in March 1943 when an urgent 
personal message from British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill arrived explaining that Canada 
was to lose priority on trans-Atlantic shipping. 
Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff meet with 
Mackenzie King and the Canadian War Cabinet:
1. J.L. Ilsley; 2. Sir J. Martin; 3. Lord Leathers; 4. Churchill; 5. Field 
Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Br.); 6. 
Admiral Sir A. Cunningham, Chief of the Naval Staff (Br.); 7. Air Chief 
Marshal Sir C. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Br.); 8. Field Marshal J. 
Dill; 9. General Sir Hastings Ismay; 10. Air Marshal R. Leckie, Chief 
of the Air Staff (Cdn.); General M.A. Pope; 12. Lieutenant-General 
J.C. Murchie, Chief of the General Staff (Cdn.); 13. Vice Admiral G.C. 
Jones, Chief of the Naval Staff (Cdn.); 14. Louis St. Laurent; 15. C.G. 
Power; 16. T.A. Crerar; 17. Mackenzie King; 18. A.D.P. Heeney; 19 
J.L. Ralston; 20. Angus L. Macdonald.
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
A
rc
hi
ve
s 
C
an
ad
a 
(L
A
C
 ) 
C
 2
69
30
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss2/5
25
Churchill told King that because the Canadian 
Army would not be involved in major operations 
in the near future, the trans-Atlantic shipping 
that had been assigned to transport Canadian 
troops needed to complete the organization of the 
overseas army would instead be assigned to US 
Army Air Force personnel.9  Ralston was furious 
and his view that the changed shipping priority 
indicated the need to ensure early action for any 
substantial part of the army won considerable 
support in Cabinet. King, in what his diary 
suggests was one of the more difficult decisions 
of his career, began to shift his support away 
from McNaughton’s view that any major mission 
must be only for the whole of the army as a large 
national formation. The prime minister sent a 
message to Churchill urging that employment be 
found in the Mediterranean theatre for 
any part of the army.10  
The continued insistence of Ralston 
and Stuart that active employment be 
found for at least part of the Canadian 
forces and the support of the full 
government that King, however great 
his private misgivings, had provided 
since the shipping crisis in March, paid 
off on 23 April 1943. General Brooke 
asked General McNaughton if the 
Canadian Government would be willing 
to commit one infantry division and one 
tank brigade to Operation “Husky.”11  
McNaughton sent a telegram to General 
Stuart requesting permission from the 
government for Canadian troops to 
participate in the operation. As a result 
of discussions by the War Committee 
and decisions it had previously reached, 
Mackenzie King gave his approval after 
reviewing McNaughton’s telegram. King 
recorded in his diary that night that it 
was a shame that McNaughton’s army 
was to be broken up but felt that what 
would be accomplished would more than 
offset the division of the army. Within 48 
hours McNaughton was able to inform 
the CIGS that his government had 
authorized participation in the proposed 
operation.12  
Shortly after midnight, 10 July 1943, Mackenzie 
King announced to his country that Canadian 
armed forces, along with those of Britain and 
the United States were “in the forefront of an 
attack which has as its ultimate objective the 
unconditional surrender of Italy and Germany.” 
He continued, “All of Canada will be justifiably 
proud to know that units of the Canadian Army 
are a part of the Allied forces engaged in this 
attack.”13  The landing by the 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division on Pachino Beach marked “the 
beginning of a new phase of war”14  for Canada’s 
army, after four long years of waiting and training 
in the United Kingdom. Logical as it might seem 
that the prime minister should make this early 
announcement of a major national military 
initiative, he had in fact encountered enormous 
General A.G.L. McNaughton, the commander of 
the army, was a proponent of keeping the army 
together to maintain its national character.
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difficulties in receiving clearance to do so from 
the Allied high command. 
As the countdown to Operation “Husky” 
proceeded and plans were finalized, General 
Stuart informed Canadian military authorities in 
London that the government wished to provide as 
much information as possible about operations 
in Sicily to the Canadian public as soon as was 
feasible.15  King was anxious that the participation 
of Canadian forces in “Husky” be known by 
the public immediately since involvement in 
an operation of this magnitude was long in 
coming and important to the Canadian war 
effort. The resulting Sicilian crisis, a crisis on 
the prestige front as Massey referred to it,16  was 
a complicated affair, spanning many days and 
embroiling military and political authorities on 
three continents. 
On 7 July, with the invasion of Sicily only days 
away, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) 
in Ottawa received from the Canadian Joint 
Staff (CJS) Washington advance copies of the 
announcements to be released after the operation 
began.17  From his headquarters in Algiers, North 
Africa, General Eisenhower, commander-in-chief 
of Allied Forces, proposed three announcements: 
(a) a communique for general release, (b) an avis 
to the people of France and, (c) a proclamation 
to the Italian people. The immediate reaction of 
both Ralston and Mackenzie King was that the 
drafts were “thoroughly objectionable” because 
they made no mention of Canada.18  Lester B. 
Pearson, then a senior official with the Canadian 
legation in Washington and a key player in the 
crisis, later recalled that the response of his 
government, “was swift and decisive, references 
to Anglo-American forces [had to] be changed 
to American-British-Canadian forces.”19  The 
original proclamation to the Italian people began 
“on behalf of the governments of the United 
States and Great Britain, the Allied Forces 
are occupying Italian territory” and the avis, 
which mentioned only “the Anglo-American 
forces,”20  were unacceptable. National Defence 
Headquarters requested that Canadian Military 
Headquarters (CMHQ) in London and the CJS 
in Washington discuss the matter with their 
British and American colleagues and request 
that references to Canada and Canadian forces 
be included. NDHQ made these inquiries in both 
Washington and London since the announcements 
regarding the landings were to be released in 
General McNaughton (right) talks to Major D.E. Walker, while Major-General Guy Simonds, commander
of 1st Canadian Infantry Division (left) and Brigadier Walford look on, Sicily, 20  August 1943.
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both Allied capitals.21  The CJS  replied on 8 
July that the British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) 
recommended that Eisenhower should not make 
the broadcast of the proclamation and instead 
that the announcement should be made by the 
British prime minister and American president. 
In addition, the CJS reported that BJSM had 
transmitted the Canadian concerns to the British 
high command in London. Eisenhower was 
then notified by the British Joint Staff Mission 
that the announcements should be released in 
Canada as well as Washington and London.22  A 
telegram from Canadian Joint Staff Washington 
to National Defence Headquarters dated 9 July 
confirmed that the instructions had been sent to 
Eisenhower.23  
On 7 July, Vincent Massey had received early 
confirmation that the proclamation to the 
Italian people was to be made by Churchill and 
Roosevelt, not Eisenhower. Massey reported 
to Canada that the proposed text read: “At this 
moment the combined armed forces of the United 
States and Great Britain are under command of 
General Eisenhower… ”24  Massey also explained 
that for reasons of military security it was 
difficult to mention Canadian participation in 
the operation. However, Canadian concerns were 
sympathetically received by British authorities 
and every effort was to be made to find a suitable 
solution.25  
On 8 July the United States War Department 
informed the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington 
that authorization had been given by Eisenhower’s 
headquarters stating that Eisenhower had 
agreed that King could make reference to the 
participation of Canadian troops in Operation 
“Husky” 24 hours after the landings started. The 
British War Office informed CMHQ on 9 July that 
to prevent any aid from being given to the enemy, 
no announcement regarding the participation of 
Canadian forces could be made at the time of 
the landings. 26  As a result, King believed that 
the British were being unnecessarily difficult.27  
However, Mackenzie King was wrong about the 
British, as Massey felt that distinct progress was 
being made and recorded in his diary that he 
was confident Canada would be mentioned in the 
communiques and the proclamation.28  
On 8 July King informed Massey that if it were 
not possible to mention Canadian forces for 
security reasons, then the proclamation should 
refer to only “Allied Forces.” Additionally, if the 
proclamation was to be issued by Churchill and 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Air Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner, Mrs. Winston Churchill, Vice-Admiral
Percy W. Nelles and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart at the Quebec Conference, August 1943.
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Roosevelt then King felt he should be included 
with the British prime minister and American 
president in the announcement. King requested 
that the text of the agreed upon proclamation 
be available in Canada for simultaneous release 
by the Canadian prime minister. He stressed to 
Massey, “the importance of the Prime Minister 
being in a position to inform Canadians that 
their forces are at last in action.”29  This strong 
statement indicates the extent to which Massey’s 
report of 7 July, from British sources, regarding 
Eisenhower’s security concerns about mentioning 
Canada, had left King with the impression that the 
British were not helping to exert enough pressure 
on Eisenhower. King, in fact, was convinced that 
the British were the main problem. 
For this reason, King turned to the US president, 
appealing for his personal intervention in an 
evening phone call on 8 July. This was an unusual 
initiative, of the kind reserved for critical issues 
touching on fundamental national interests, and is 
compelling proof of the importance King attached 
to the recognition of Canada’s military effort. King 
reached the White House and spoke with Harry 
Hopkins, the president’s trusted aide, who was 
then in the middle of dinner with Roosevelt.30  
The prime minister arranged with Hopkins 
for Lester B. Pearson, the minister counselor 
of the Canadian Legation in Washington, to 
meet with the president at once to discuss the 
situation. Pearson saw Roosevelt at 2140 hours 
that evening and reported to Ottawa shortly 
thereafter that both Hopkins and the president 
were “most friendly and sympathetic” regarding 
the Canadian situation. The two understood that 
any mention of “armed forces” in statements 
regarding “Husky” that did not refer to Canadian 
forces alongside British-American forces would 
be objectionable to Canada. Pearson reported 
that after some thought Roosevelt agreed specific 
mention of Canada was the preferable course 
of action and that he would take the necessary 
steps to ensure Canadians were, indeed, included 
in any statement made about the launch of the 
operation.31  Later that same evening King sent a 
telegram to Massey outlining what was discussed 
between Pearson and Roosevelt in Washington. 
He told Massey that the president had assured 
Pearson that there would be plenty of time to 
consider the Canadian point of view and make the 
necessary changes.32  The implication of King’s 
message was that in sharp contrast to the British 
the Americans were being extraordinarily helpful.
In fact, British authorities had already taken 
significant action in response to Massey’s 
complaints. The War Office in London had 
Colonel J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, talking to General P.J. Montague and Vincent Massey at Hendon 
airport after flying in from Italy, 4 October 1944.
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telegraphed Eisenhower informing him that 
the British chiefs of staff had arranged for the 
Canadians to be mentioned in the Churchill-
Roosevelt proclamation and that it was assumed 
similar mention of the Canadians would be 
made in the avis to the French.33  On 9 July 
NDHQ received a telegram from Canadian Joint 
Staff Washington confirming that “Canadian 
participation in ‘Husky’ [was] to be mentioned in 
joint message from President and Prime Minister 
to the Italian people.” The telegram further stated: 
“assume that Canadians will be mentioned by 
name in the avis…to the people of Metropolitan 
France.”34  In his telegram to King on 9 July, 
Massey confirmed that he had seen telegrams 
exchanged between London and Washington and 
that the proclamation issued by Roosevelt and 
Churchill would read the “combined forces of 
the United States, Great Britain and Canada.” 
However, Massey reiterated to Mackenzie King 
that for military reasons the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff were reluctant to mention the presence of 
Canadians during an early stage of the operation. 
They had only agreed to do so because of the 
special circumstances King outlined in his 
telegram of 8 July.35  King’s reply to Massey 
revealed that he was not impressed with Massey’s 
telegram. He did acknowledge the efforts that 
were being made to change the wording of 
the avis and the proclamation. However, one 
paragraph of King’s telegram clearly reflected 
his mood: 
The objection…to associating the Prime Minister 
of Canada with the Proclamation does not 
impress us. This…does not accord with 
President’s statement…that there would be 
ample time to have consideration given to our 
views in preparation of Proclamation to the 
Italian people.36 
 Shortly after midnight on 10 July, 
Eisenhower’s communique was issued from 
Allied Headquarters in Algiers announcing 
the start of operations in Sicily but it made 
reference only to “Allied Forces.” 37  Only ten 
minutes later, however, King received word at 
his residence that a flash had come from the War 
Department in Washington beginning, “British-
United States-Canadian forces have launched 
an attack on Sicily.”38  Lester Pearson on his way 
home heard a similar report on the radio in 
Washington stating: “British, American, (pause) 
and Canadian troops have commenced landing 
operations in Sicily.”39  This announcement from 
the War Department in Washington came as a 
surprise since Eisenhower’s communique had 
referred only to “Allied Forces.” Nonetheless, it 
is important to note that the avis to the French 
people made reference to the participation of 
Canadian forces.40  Upon hearing about the radio 
broadcast from Washington, Prime Minister King 
decided he could issue his own statement to the 
country. He arranged for the statement to be 
given to the press immediately and at 0800 hours 
read his statement on the radio:41 “All Canada 
will be justifiably proud to know that units of 
the Canadian Army are a part of the allied force 
engaged in the attack.”42  
 Vincent Massey, on the morning of 10 July, 
heard the announcement of the Sicilian landing, 
J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, shaking 
hands with W.L. Mackenzie King after proposing a toast 
to “Our Leader” at a banquet celebrating Mr. King’s 25th 
anniversary as leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, 7 
August 1944. 
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which gave full recognition to the participation 
of Canadian troops, and felt that the wording of 
the announcement was largely due to the efforts 
of his office over the previous days.43  Mackenzie 
King, on the other hand, believed that were it not 
for his late night phone call to the White House, 
Canadians would not have been mentioned in 
any of the statements announcing the beginning 
of “Husky.” As he wrote in his diary, “So much 
for Britain.”44  King, renowned for his caution, 
calculation and reserve, was so deeply upset 
that he could not contain his indignation. Upon 
returning to Kingsmere, his country estate, on 
10 July, he found that the Governor General and 
Princess Alice were visiting. Before they left, King 
told them about the exchange of telegrams and 
the efforts that his government had gone to, to get 
consent from the British to announce Canadian 
participation in the “Husky” operation. King 
explained how quickly the American president 
had agreed to the mention of Canadian troops 
and that he (King), “would have been wholly 
discredited…had [he] not taken the stand [he] 
did at midnight.” King freely drew extreme 
conclusions: “…had no announcement come 
about Canadians participating from their own 
government, [his] political career would have” 
ended and “it would have been one of those fatal 
omissions that nothing could make good.”45  
 On Monday morning, 12 July, Mackenzie King 
announced to the Canadian House of Commons 
that operations in Sicily had commenced and 
that Canadians were indeed participating. King 
also assured the House that since the outbreak 
of the war the government had insisted Canadian 
forces, whether in whole or in part, should be 
used when and where they could make the best 
contribution.46  On 13 July the prime minister 
and the minister of National Defence, were 
questioned in the House about whether the 
inclusion of Canadian troops in Sicily meant that 
the army had been broken up. Ralston replied 
by reiterating what he had said previously in the 
House on 13 May 1943: “It has always been and 
still is our policy that the Canadian army in whole 
or in part is available to be used wherever and 
for whatever task would best serve the common 
cause.”47 
 In the House on 14 July the minister 
was asked if he could reveal the name of the 
commanding officer of the Canadian forces in 
Sicily. Ralston replied that for reasons of security, 
he could not provide that kind of information 
until Eisenhower gave permission to do so. R.B. 
Hanson, leader of the Opposition protested that 
“It is a remarkable situation, because I have 
read in the press the names of all the allied 
commanders and Canada is just not in that 
picture…I hope there is a Canadian commander 
of some prominence and standing…”48  Ralston 
corrected Hanson, reminding the members that 
none of the names of the Allied divisional or even 
corps commanders had been released.49  
 This was typical of Ralston’s normally 
cautious public statements. Uncharacteristically, 
however, he then let some of his frustration show: 
“I do not want to add fuel to the flame of public 
desire, but I must say that sometimes I am irked 
at the security regulations which it is necessary 
to enforce.”50  More unusually still, Mr. King then 
proceeded to vent more fully and stated that he 
had made his announcement to the Canadian 
people Friday night in spite of being asked 
Mackenzie King, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt pose for a photograph during the Quebec 
Conference, August 1943.
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not to make any mention of Canadian forces 
participating in “Husky” until late Saturday.51  
King continued to show his anger in the House 
the next day, and in fact related the full details of 
what he saw as a sordid slight against Canada by 
Britain in contrast to the help he received from 
Washington.52 
 King wrote in his diary that night that, “it 
was really unbelievable that with all Canada has 
done in this war for Britain, that our position 
should have been so completely and deliberately 
overlooked by the British…”53  Both Vincent 
Massey and Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Stacey, then 
the head of the army’s overseas historical section 
and privy to high-level information, recorded in 
their diaries on 16 July that King’s statement 
in the House which had blamed the British had 
caused quite a stir at CMHQ in London. Military 
authorities there thought that the British War 
Office had been fully cooperative and had made 
every effort on the behalf of Canadians, as had the 
Americans, to convince Eisenhower to mention 
the Canadian forces. Stacey went even further, 
suggesting that there was the possibility that 
Canadian relations with the British would suffer 
as a result.54  King’s attack on British military 
authorities was certainly an embarrassment to 
Canadian military authorities. Churchill, upon 
hearing of King’s statement was livid. 55  
 Malcolm MacDonald, the British High 
Commissioner in Canada, recorded that many 
people in Canada wrongly believed that once 
Canadian troops were finally participating in 
action, the British authorities had tried to prevent 
the news of their participation from reaching the 
public. He believed that Mackenzie King’s false 
perception of events and his statement in the 
House of Commons had fostered this belief.56  
Like Stacey, MacDonald was also worried about 
the effect on Anglo-Canadian relations.57  Winston 
Churchill, in a telegram to King on 17 July, told 
the Canadian prime minister that reports of his 
suggestion that Canada got better treatment from 
the United States than from Britain made for 
“painful reading.”58  He expressed his unhappiness 
that King had felt slighted but reiterated that the 
Canadians were receiving ample press coverage 
in the London papers.59  Churchill also informed 
King that he had given the War Office instructions 
to release the name of the Canadian commander 
and that it had not been done up until that point 
because no commanders of any nationality 
had been named except for army commanders 
and higher. Churchill did admit that perhaps 
an exception should have been made for the 
Canadians because of the long period that they 
had been waiting to see action, but at the same 
time, asked King to understand how difficult it 
was to keep everything straight.60 
 The situation deteriorated further the 
following day when Churchill received the full 
text of Mackenzie King’s outburst in the House. 
Churchill wrote to King that he could not accept 
the position in which King had put him. He 
was to be questioned about King’s statement in 
the British Parliament the following Tuesday. 
Churchill then asked the Canadian prime 
minister for suggestions about how he should 
answer the questions in Parliament.61  King 
did not reply directly to Churchill but instead 
asked MacDonald what Churchill meant when 
he said he could not accept the position. When 
MacDonald replied with the obvious answer, 
that Churchill could not accept the suggestion 
the British authorities had opposed mentioning 
Canadian forces, King became angry.62  King 
informed MacDonald that if Churchill gave a 
statement in parliament he would dissolve the 
Canadian parliament and call an election. If that 
were not enough, King argued he would not fight 
the election on that one issue alone, but rather 
on the, “treatment of Canada by the British 
government, which had frequently forgotten 
Churchill and King shake
hands during happier times.
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that Canada was a Dominion.” He suggested 
that, “on matters of importance to Canada, [the 
British] had ignored Canada’s rights as a free 
member of the Commonwealth…” and that, “he 
had sometimes permitted himself…to be ignored 
as no Canadian Prime Minister should be…”63  
That he had let himself be ignored was one 
matter, but King was not prepared to stand idly 
by while Canadian soldiers were put in a position 
of inferiority when compared with their British 
and American counterparts. That King would 
suggest the British sometimes forgot Canada was 
a Dominion is interesting. Since the outbreak of 
the war, the Canadian government and military 
authorities had been fighting to assert Canadian 
independence and ensure that they remained 
in control over Canadian troops. This episode 
suggests volumes about the confused status of 
not only the Canadian Army but the country as 
well. 
 As King continued to rage, Malcolm 
MacDonald pointed out that he had read all 
the relevant correspondence and reported that 
London’s attitude towards the Canadian situation 
had been “as unexceptional as Washington’s.” In 
fact, the two governments had actually cooperated 
in sending instructions to Eisenhower’s 
headquarters to carry out the request that 
mention be made of Canadian participation in 
the communiques about the start of operations 
in Sicily.64  MacDonald further suggested that the 
Canadian prime minister had misunderstood 
the attitude of the British authorities and as a 
result had been quite unfair to them, because in 
reality, the British had been just as cooperative 
as the Americans. MacDonald told King that in 
all likelihood, the time difference between Ottawa 
and London (as opposed to between Ottawa and 
Washington) was the probable reason for the 
perceived slowness of answers coming out of 
London. 
 The next day, after having a chance to cool 
down, King agreed to write a draft response 
for Churchill and told MacDonald he no longer 
wished to call an election if Churchill made 
an unsatisfactory statement in the British 
Parliament. Churchill found King’s statement too 
long, but in his message to Parliament proposed 
that no one in particular was to blame for the 
misunderstanding and that the matter was 
officially closed.65 
 The incident publicly showed Mackenzie 
King at his worst.  He was clearly wrong about 
the attitude of the British and could have 
done serious harm to the Anglo-Canadian 
relationship.66  Malcolm MacDonald believed 
King never would have called a general election 
but the incident made MacDonald realize the 
seriousness of the situation and that irritation at 
the treatment of Canada was widespread among 
ministers and citizens of the country.67  Massey, 
in addition, believed that King’s annoyance at the 
situation was derived from a number of incidents 
in the previous months which had disrupted 
Anglo-Canadian relations and because it was only 
a last minute intervention in both Washington and 
London that led to the mention of Canadians in 
the Churchill-Roosevelt proclamation. Massey felt 
the situation was exasperated by the Canadian 
prime minister’s hyper-sensitivity about Anglo-
Canadian relations whereas the British prime 
minister was insensitive. The entire situation 
could have been avoided, Massey felt, if only 
someone conscious of the Canadian sentiment 
had reviewed the proclamation and pointed 
out the omission of Canada.68 In a message to 
Winston Churchill on 19 July, although he never 
apologized to the British prime minister, King did 
acknowledge that the British had indeed agreed 
to the mention of Canadian forces.69 
 In the end, Mackenzie King supported 
McNaughton for as long as he could but public 
opinion and the fear of overseas conscription 
eventually got the better of him. Clearly, it was an 
agonizing decision to support Ralston, who had 
no qualms about overseas conscription, rather 
than McNaughton who was determined to avoid 
it. King’s reluctance to make such a decision, 
and the enormous strains on him, were evident 
in the mixed messages he sent about what he 
wanted for the Canadian Army and what he saw 
as Canada’s place in the higher direction of the 
war. The full extent of the strain he bore, and 
the over-riding importance he had finally come 
to attach to early action for the army, was clearly 
evident in his thoroughly uncharacteristic public 
outbursts in Parliament in July 1943, and his 
unwillingness to make amends with Churchill 
even days later, when normally anger would 
have cooled. It was a particularly remarkable 
incident because King was the exact reverse of 
a passionate leader; invariably he was able to 
contain his emotions in the service of larger and 
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longer term political interests. In the matter 
of war fighting, King had long been convinced 
that his, and his government’s, interests were 
best served by publicly promoting his warm 
friendship with Churchill, whose popularity 
in Canada was enormous. Privately, King’s 
relationship with Churchill was very different as 
their confrontations over recognition of the Royal 
Canadian Navy’s leading part in the Battle of the 
Atlantic and the creation of Royal Canadian Air 
Force overseas units and formations shows.70  
 Ultimately, despite the important requirement 
for combat experience, 1st Canadian Division 
and, subsequently, I Canadian Corps were sent 
to the Mediterranean for very different reasons, 
rooted in domestic politics and questions of 
national prestige. The government so forcefully 
pushed for action that it did what Mackenzie 
King had always been exceedingly reluctant to do 
– dictate on what were arguably purely military 
matters to senior Allied commanders. Sending 
the division to Sicily also meant removing a 
British division that had already begun training. 
Sending a corps, including an armoured 
division, to Italy, moreover, meant establishing 
an additional headquarters where one was not 
needed nor wanted.71  This is, of course, not to 
say that the Canadian Army performed poorly 
as a result of its government’s actions. On the 
contrary, the army lived up to the reputation it 
had established during the First World War; this, 
rather paradoxically, was in fact the ultimate 
reason why General McNaughton had wanted the 
army to remain intact. 
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